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HUSBAND AND WIFE AS HEIRS OF EACH OTHER
By EMIL

T

BAENSCH*

HIS phrase is unknown to the common law, which claims to be
based on the authority of God and His word that "they twain
shall be one flesh," and that "one flesh" was the husband. The wife's
claims to personal property were wholly ignored, her interest in real
estate handicapped by restrictions rooted in feudalism, and the ceremonial "obey" amplified nigh unto slavery. A. W. Calhoun, in his
Social History of the American Family, well defines her as "an unrecorded cipher lost in the oblivion of domestic toil and the bearing
of children."
After floundering through the Articles of Confederation period, the
Fathers found is necessary to draft a constitution, but as to laws of
property and inheritance they were content with the common law of
England with which they were familiar. Soon, however, dissatisfaction
became noticeable, first finding expression in the equity courts who
tried, to the extent of their power, to modify the injustice of the common law. Then came voices from the frontier, which Professor
Paxson calls the "propagating bed for new ideas and new social experiments," and where there was developed that phase of the American
spirit modernized in the slogan of a "square deal." Then, too, we
note the beginning of co-education-and thus the stage was all set
for an active and persistent propaganda.
In 1821 Maine declared that a woman abandoned by her husband
might enter into contracts and convey property. In 1836 a bill was
presented in the New York Legislature to remove the common law
disabilities of married women. It was defeated. But defeat only
increased the zeal of the proponents, and twelve years later, in 1848,
within a few days of each other, New York and Pennsylvania adopted
the "married women's enabling acts." During the next decade not
a year passed without some state doing likewise. Virginia, in 1877,
was the last state to do so. Old England, too, saw the light, although,
with proverbial John Bull slowness, not until a generation later, passing a similar though not as generous a law in 187o.
This success is chaptered as "the social revolution of 1848," and
hailed as a "wondrous social revolution." But it was more, so much
more that no one is rash enough to prophesy the ultimate cultural,
economic, political, even physical results of this much praised "emanci* Member of Manitowoc Bar.
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pation." It was an economic revolution, for women swarmed into
industry and commerce and the professions, bringing to every community the increasing problems of the "married woman employee,"
a problem the solution of which may possibly be aided by the vaudeville jokester portraying the wife as the breadwinner and the husband
as the cradle rocker. Recent returns from Texas and Wyoming
portend a political revolution, bringing machine puzzles to politics
and word puzzles to politeness. What shall we call Her Excellency?
We use "mayoress" and therefore, at first blush, we should call her
"governess." But that would degrade Ma as well as those whom she
rules. Apparently we must enlarge our vocabulary and, borrowing
from the Old French, use the sonorous "governoress."
These newly established rights did not harmonize with the inheritance
rights of the common law, as adopted and declared in the statutes of
the older states. Again we note the frontier's activity as it moved
westward and developed a more distinct and typical American character,
unhampered by the traditions of the common law. As a California
lawyer expressed it to the writer, "We look upon dower and curtesy
as you do upon wager of battle and benefit of clergy." justice suggested a larger and more definite share for the widow, and the
"square deal" required that the widower be placed on an equality with
the widow as to rights of inheritance. The movement was greatly
accelerated by the Louisiana Purchase, which brought us the French
law, and by the Mexican War, which brought us the Spanish law,
each based on the civil law; and here, in the Far West and in the Southwest, the common law came in contact and in conflict with the civil
law, and the "descent" and "distribution" of the former gave way to
the "succession" of the latter. As a result every state west of the
Mississippi except Oregon and Arkansas, every mid-west state except
Wisconsin, several New England, Middle and Southern states, in fact,
all but a bare dozen of the forty-eight states, give to the husband
the same rights of inheritance in his wife's estate that she has in
his. There you meet the "surviving spouse" instead of only the
"widow."
As to the property rights of women, Wisconsin kept pace with the
other states. The Ordinance of 1787 established the common law in
what is now Wisconsin. In 1846 a movement for statehood resulted in
a constitutional convention. An article, borrowed from Texas, giving
married women the right to hold property, was adopted after many days
of heated debate, Marshal Strong, leader of the opposition, resigning
in disgust. In the campaign for ratification this article furnished
one of the main targets for the opposition. This law will disrupt
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the family for it is the apple of discord though covered with gold. The
position of woman in the Latin nations was contrasted with her
treatment in America. It has been borrowed from the civil law which
does not recognize the moral and sacred nature of marriage, but
treats it as a mere civil contract. The consensus of historians was
presented that when the laws relating to rights of married women were
the most amplified, Rome was the most corrupt and immoral. At the
ensuing election the constitution was decisively rejected, sixty per
cent of the voters registering "No."
The following year another convention was called, much smaller
in membership and more diplomatic in temper. As Morgan L. Martin,
its president, stated: "Some members I thought quite visionary on the
women's rights question as to the holding of property. We omitted
such mooted questions," thus leaving it for future legislative action.
The constitution it presented was ratified by the people, and today
we proudly point to it as one of the oldest and most permanent in the
sisterhood of states.
In the Legislature the progressive faction was somewhat more
successful. Promptly, in 1850, married women were given the right
to hold property. Nine years later she was granted the privilege to
make her will without her husband's consent. Over a decade later, in
1872, she was allowed her individual earnings and empowered to sue in
her own right. A generation passed ere conveyances between husband
and wife were legalized, in 1895, and not until our own generation,
in 1921, came the climax that "women shall have the same rights and
privileges under the law as men in the exercise of suffrage, freedom
of contract, choice of residence for voting purposes, jury service,
holding and conveying property, care and custody of children, and in
all other respects."
But when we turn from property rights to inheritance rights we
find Wisconsin with the non-progressive minority. At the start the
widow was given homestead and dower rights in the real estate and a
child's share of the personal property. If no descendants survived,
then she was given all the property for life, and at her death it
went to her father-in-law. If he was not living it went (horrible
dictu) to her mother-in-law and the brothers and sisters of her husband in equal shares. The widower was granted curtsey where
children of the wife by him, or their descendants, survived; if none,
then his share was zero.
In 1864 the Legislattve recognized the unfairness of giving the
widow only a life estate, where there were no descendants surviving,
and that year the law was changed so that the widow, in case of no
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issue surviving, would at least receive the homestead in fee.1 This
started the ball rolling, and four years later they passed the law
which gives her all the estate, where no issue survive. 2 Then, in I87O,
the widower, too, was recognized and it was enacted that when a woman
3
dies, leaving no issue, all her estate goes to her husband.
Thus the law remained for nearly half a century, but some symptoms
of dissatisfaction were manifested in the matter of allowances. At
the start, the widow was allowed: (i) the apparel and ornaments
of the husband; (2) the household furniture not exceeding $250 in
value; (3) other personal property to be selected by her not exceeding $2oo in value; (4) if the inventory showed a residue not exceeding $I5o after payment of funeral charges and expenses, then
this too was given to the widow for the support and maintenance of herself and minor children.
In igoi, came a small additional allowance: namely, family pictures
not specifically bequeathed, and the provisions and fuel on hand for
family use.4 Eight years later the fourth allowance was raised
from $150 to $5oo, 5 and in 1913, this was increased to $i,ooo of the
estate, 6 amended in I919, to mean $i,ooo of the personal property.7
At the session of 1913 the Legislature also concluded that the second
allowance, the limit of $250 on furniture, was unreasonable, and pro8
vided that thereafter the widow receive all the furniture.

'See ch. 270-Wis. Session Laws 1864. Wis. Stats. 2276a. (Note: Session laws
of 1864 state that homestead shall descend free from incumbrances, except
mortgage.)
'See ch. 6I-Wis. Session Laws 1868: "If he shall have no issue, his estate, real
and personal, shall descend to his widow: and if he shall leave no issue or widow,
his estate shall descend to his father." Wis. Stats. 2270()
'See ch. I2I-Wis. Session Laws 1870: "If woman shall die leaving no issue,
her state real and personal, shall descend to her husband, if she have one at time
of her decease, etc." Wis. Stats.

2270.(2)

'See ch. 76-Wis. Session Laws 19ol : "Widow shall be allowed also the household furniture of deceased,-also all provisions and fuel on hand provided for
family use." Wis. Stats. 3935.(I)
'See ch. 56-Wis. Session Laws igo9: "If on return of inventory, value of
, ct. may assign whole of such estate for use
estate shall not exceed sum of and support of widow and minor children." Wis. Stats. Ch. 318 on "Allowances
and Distribution."
'See ch. 520-Wis. Session Laws 1913. Wis. Stats. 3935. (4)
'See ch. 411-Wis. Session Laws i919: "Ct. may assign from residue of personal estate a sum or value not exceeding one thousand dollars for use and support of widow and minor children of deceased." -Wis. Stats. 3935.(4) and (5)
' See ch. 536-Wis. Session Laws 1913: "Widow shall be allowed, also all the
household furniture of the deceased." (Not limited to certain value as in previous stat.)

Wis. Stat. 3935.0)
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But it was in 1917 that a most radical change in the inheritance
laws was proposed. In that year Senator Benfey, of Sheboygan, introduced a lengthy bill, carefully drawn by the legislative reference
bureau. It abolished dower and curtsey, made husband and wife equal
heirs of each other, giving each of them one third of the other's real
and personal estate. It further provided that if, after payment of
expenses, funeral charges, and debts, no more than $3,oo0 remained, it
be all assigned to the surviving spouse. The bill did not pass, but
one forward step was taken in that the widow was given one third of
the personal estate instead of only a child's share, as theretofore. 9
Four years later another forward step was taken. Dower was
changed to mean one third of the lands outside of the homestead, instead of only the income thereof during life. Of the homestead the
widow is allowed one third of the proceeds of a sale, if such sale takes
place during her widowhood. 10 Courtsey was changed in that it is
now extinguished by remarriage of the widower." The change in the
definition of dower, as applied to the homestead, is causing some
difficulty in the drafting of final decrees. There does not seem to be
any good reason why a widow should not receive dower in the homestead as well as in the other real estate. It would seem to have been
much simpler to have abolished dower instead of giving it a definition out of harmony with its origin and long established meaning.
The fact that three fourths of the states treat husband and wife
as equal heirs of each other shows a general trend of legislation which
it would seem proper for Wisconsin to follow. Since the Benfey Bill
was proposed, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and West Virginia have
joined the procession. England also, from whence we received the
common law, has deemed it best to modernize her inheritance laws.
After a careful investigation and much debate, Parliament adopted
what is officially known as the "Law of Property Act, 1922."
This English Property Act does away with the distinction between
real and personal estate, the same being "held by the personal representatives, as to the real estate upon trust to sell the same, and as
to the personal estate, upon trust to call in, sell and convert into
money . . . with power to postpone such sale and conversion."

'See ch. i4-Wis. Session Laws
"0See ch. 99-Wis. Sesion Laws

It

1917.

"Widow of every deceased person dybg
after Aug. 31, 1921, shall be entitled to a one-third part of lands whereof her
husband was seized, etc." Wis. Stats. 2159.
" See ch. 31-Wis. Session Laws 192I: "Husband on death of wife shall hold
lands of which she died seized, etc.; provided further, that in case of any husband
whose wife dies after Aug. 31, 1921, then any right of curtesy he may have attained shall be extinguished upon his remarriage." Wis. Stats. 218o.
1921:
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then provides for the payment of costs, funeral expenses and debts,
and calls the balance the "residuary estate," which, however, is "subject
to the sum of one thousand pounds . . . charged in favor . . . hus-

band or wife." It then abolishes "all existing modes, rules and canons
of descent, and of devolution by special occupancy, or otherwise, of
real estate, or of personal inheritance," and "tenancy by the curtesy
and every other estate and interest of a husband in real estate as to
which his wife dies intestate," and "dower and free bench and every
other estate and interest of a wife in real estate as to which her husband dies intestate."
"The residuary estate . . . shall be distributed in the manner or
held on the trusts mentioned . . . : namely, If the intestate leaves a

husband or wife (with or without issue) the surviving husband or
wife shall take the personal chattels absolutely, and in addition the
residuary estate . . . shall stand charged with the payment of a net

sum of one thousand pounds, free of death duties and costs, to the
surviving husband or wife with interest thereon from the date of the
death at the rate of five pounds per cent per annum until paid or appropriated." Subject to that charge, the residuary estate, where there
is no issue, is held upon trust for the surviving husband or wife during life, and where the intestate leaves issue one half is thus held
for the surviving husband or wife, the other half going to the issue.
An echo of the ancient doctrine is heard in a section specifically
providing that "husband and wife shall for all purposes of distribution
and division be treated as two persons." On the other hand, the up-todate nature of the law appears in a section defining "personal chattels"
by including "motor cars and accessories not used for business purposes," but, nevertheless, leaves a bad taste in the mouth by also
mentioning "wines and liquors."
In view of this strong and increasing tendency toward making husband and wife heirs of each other, we are justified in presenting to
the Wisconsin solons the query, "If eventually, why not now ?" In the
case of a childless couple we are already committed to the new theory,
but where there are children we cling to ancient doctrines and recognize only the wife. Why not wear the jewel of consistency?
Even more important is that part of the Benfey Bill, also embodied in the English Act, which gives a specified amount to the
surviving spouse before distributing the estate. To this theory, too,
we are practically committed, for we now allow the widow a thousand
dollars of the personal property. Why not raise this to the English
standard of $5,000, include real estate and apply it also to the widower?
The practical effect and the real purpose of this provision is, that,
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in the case of a small estate, it all go to. the surviving spouse. To
distribute an estate not exceeding $5,00 among parent and several
children is really dissipating it. Giving it to the surviving spouse is
of more benefit. The children will not suffer, for any one experienced
in probate matters will endorse the statement that, if the children
are young, parental love is a better protection than statutory regulation, and if they are mature, they can take care of themselves. It
will, to some extent, ward off that dependence of aged parents on children which so often spells misery and sorrow. Let us urge the coming
legislative session to live up to Wisconsin's motto in this matter of
inheritance.

